Development of Iraq’s civil society groups: Center for Middle East Policy
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Nearly two decades after the US invasion, democratic consolidation is still elusive in Iraq – that is, at least, according to a panel of experts considering the relationship between the development of the country’s civil society organisations (CSOs) and its democracy, in a thought-provoking discussion on Monday.
Chaired by Simona Foltyn, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings event explored the findings of a recently published report on the post-war development of civil society groups in Iraq’s mid-Euphrates region by Marsin Alshamary, who joined the panel alongside Shamiran Mako and Lahib Higel.
By examining the development of CSOs in relatively stable, prosperous cities in the mid-Euphrates region – Karbala and Hillah – which, in spite of this, have experienced much discontent and instability in recent years, the report essentially argues that the conditions required for organisations promoting humanitarian aid, culture, and human rights are sorely lacking in Iraq, despite international (and local) efforts to foster democratisation.
Opening up the debate delving into the relationship between democracy and civil society, Foltyn made the point that many international governments and donors consider CSOs to be an enabler for democratisation. Concerningly, therefore, Alshamary’s findings that many registered CSOs in Iraq – the bedrock of civil society – are inoperational, with only a fraction of registered organisations in operation, raise many questions.
Between 2012 to present day, Iraq has anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 registered CSOs. Comparing the data of CSOs in operation in 2015 and 2018 (public knowledge before the 2019 protest movement), Alshamary found that almost half were ‘ghost organisations’ – registered, one assumes, only to be eligible for available funding.
In Hillah, for example, Alshamary could only find 20 operational organisations out of a registered 80. In Karbala, which boasts between 120-160 registered CSOs, activists told her she wouldn’t find more than 50 official CSOs; they were right.
Mixed motivations behind registration, the drying up of easily accessible foreign funds, and societal factors like public mistrust contribute to undermining the work of CSOs.
For Mako, citing examples of low electoral turnout, limited engagement in politics, and increasingly high dissatisfaction in government performance, the public perception of CSOs in Iraq shows why the leaderless and decentralised Tishreen movement in October 2019 was a success in drawing such support. If Iraqis are distrustful of established institutions, it follows that official CSOs are not always seen as a legitimate mechanism to represent people’s interests and demands.
Referring to her report on the Tishreen protest movement, Higel argued that what the 2019 protests showed was how transforming organisational power into mobilisation is possible, but the next step – political change, creating a unified vision, pursuing an agenda, etc. – is far more challenging, and demonstrably oppressed, in Iraq.
On the role of Western donors, who all admitted frequently misunderstand the role of civil society in Iraq, Alshamary made the astute point that there seems to be an aversion to funding anything with an overtly Islamic connection. As the priorities of the donor community have shifted from humanitarian, to stabilisation, to peacebuilding – so, too, have the funding flows.
Considering whether the creation of robust CSOs might be able to constrain a corrupt political elite, Mako returned to Tishreen, and the impact it had on a local and national political level; an interesting response, as the movement was absolutely not in-line with the more traditional CSO structures.
As Alshamary warned in her concluding remarks, it is important to never take the association between civil society and democracy as a given; everything that political science has shown is that it is not inevitable, least not under restrictive environments. Higel made the point that lobbyists, or the lobbying industry, is a rarity in the Iraqi system – and when involved, all too personally interested and invested – and this is an important issue to address. A civil society outside formal politics is needed.
Despite the many challenges raised in the discussion, which is well worth re-watching, organisations that cater to local needs and serve as a positive force for change in Iraq’s society are, ultimately, worth the investment, the panel – and report – concluded. Iraqi civil society can play a role in the path towards real democratisation, and it is crucial to support those working to pursue true change.